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Abstract—There have been several approaches to the problem
of provisioning traffic engineering between core network nodes
in Internet Service Provider (ISP) networks. Such approaches
aim to minimize network delay, increase capacity, and enhance
security services between two core (relay) network nodes, an
ingress node and an egress node. MATE (Multipath Adaptive
Traffic Engineering) has been proposed for multipath adaptive
traffic engineering between an ingress node (source) and an egress
node (destination) to distribute the network flow among multiple
disjoint paths. Its novel idea is to avoid network congestion and
attacks that might exist in edge and node disjoint paths between
two core network nodes.
This paper aims to develop an adaptive, robust, and reliable
traffic engineering scheme to improve performance and reliability
of communication networks. This scheme will also provision
Quality of Server (QoS) and protection of traffic engineering
to maximize network efficiency. Specifically, S-MATE (secure
MATE) is proposed to protect the network traffic between two
core nodes (routers, switches, etc.) in a cloud network. S-MATE
secures against a single link attack/failure by adding redundancy
in one of the operational redundant paths between the sender
and receiver nodes. It is also extended to secure against multiple
attacked links. The proposed scheme can be applied to secure
core networks such as optical and IP networks.
Index Terms—MATE Protocol, Network Coding, Adaptive
Traffic Engineering, Internet Protection and Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Several approaches have been proposed for adapting the
traffic between core network nodes in Internet Service Provider
(ISP) networks [9], [13], [15]. Elwalid et al. [9] proposed an
algorithm for multipath adaptive traffic engineering between
an ingress node (source) and an egress node (destination).
Their novel idea is to avoid network congestion that might
exist in disjoint paths between two core network nodes.
They suggested load balancing among paths based on mea-
surement and analysis of path congestion by using Multi-
Protocol Label Switching (MPLS). MPLS is a widely adopted
tool for facilitating traffic engineering unlike explicit routing
protocols, which allow certain routing methodology from hop-
to-hop in a network with multiple core devices. The major
advantage of MATE is that it does not require scheduling,
buffer management, or traffic priority in the nodes.
In this work, we propose a new scheme, Secure Multi-
path Adaptive Traffic Engineering (S-MATE), that aims to
protect/secure multiple disjoint paths for network traffic. S-
MATE enables reliable data delivery and provides protection
The material in this paper was presented in part at ICC’10, Cape Town,
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Fig. 1. The network model is represented by two network nodes, ingress node
(source) and egress node (receiver). There are k link disjoint paths between
the ingress and egress nodes. The link disjoint multipaths are established by
using a network management software at the core routers.
against link and router failures. The main feature of S-MATE
is that the protection is achieved without retransmitting the
lost packets or resending the ACK/NACK messages at the
receivers. The sender keeps sending its data at a regular rate
once the key k-disjoint paths are established. In addition,
the proposed scheme provisions load balancing, meaning that
the redundant data is distributed fairly among the available
provisioned disjoint paths. Furthermore, once a certain path
experiences delay or high risk of failures, the proposed scheme
is modified to provide quality of service (QoS) traffic engineer-
ing. The latter scheme is referred to as QoS-S-MATE.
Several recovery mechanisms against failures are proposed
to ensure reliability and delivery of transmitted data by the core
router nodes in the presence of link and relay failures [18],
[20], [24]. These mechanisms also aim to guarantee the Ser-
vice Level Agreements (SLAs). Failures of links and routers
occur due to several reasons such as network component
imperfections and changes of network topology. However, the
protection operation is a challenging task because once the
failure occurs the network traffic has to be rerouted among
other routers, or delayed in the links for a short period of
time. Such circumstances are unexpected and challenging for
the network operators. One way to ensure data delivery is to
establish backup paths between ingress and egress nodes.
Network coding is a powerful tool that has been recently
used to increase the throughput, capacity, and performance
of wired and wireless communication networks. Information
theoretic aspects of network coding have been investigated
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in References [2], [21], [25], and in the list of references
therein. It offers benefits in terms of energy efficiency, ad-
ditional security, and reduced delay. Network coding allows
the intermediate nodes not only to forward packets using net-
work scheduling algorithms, but also to encode/decode them
through algebraic primitive operations [2], [11], [21], [25]. For
example, data loss because of failures in communication links
can be detected and recovered if the sources are allowed to
perform network coding operations [7], [12], [14].
Multipath Adaptive Traffic Engineering (MATE), which was
previously proposed by one of the authors of this paper, is
a traffic load balancing scheme that is suitable for S-MATE
(secure MATE) as will be explained later. MATE distributes
traffic among the edge disjoint paths, so as to equalize the
path delays. This is achieved by using adaptive algorithms.
MATE has inspired other traffic engineering solutions such
as TexCP [15] and the measurement-based optimal routing
solution [23]. In this paper, we will design a security scheme
by using network coding to protect against an entity who can
not only copy/listen to the message, but also can fabricate
new messages or modify the current ones. We aim to build
an adaptive, robust, reliable traffic engineering scheme for
better performance and operation of communication networks.
The scheme will also provision QoS and protection of traffic
engineering to maximize network efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present the network model and assumptions. In
Sections III, IV and V, we review the MATE algorithm and
propose the secure MATE scheme based on network coding.
S-MATE against single and multiple attacks is presented in
Sections VI, VII, VIII and IX. Finally, Section X concludes
the paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The network model can be represented as follows. Assume
a given network represented by a set of nodes and links. The
network nodes are core nodes that transmit outgoing packets
to the neighboring nodes in certain time slots. The network
nodes are ingress and egress nodes that share multiple edge
and node disjoint paths.
We assume that the core nodes share k edge disjoint paths,
as shown in Fig. 1, for one particular pair of ingress and egress
nodes. Let N = {N1, N2, ...} be the set of nodes (ingress
and egress nodes) and L = {L1ℓh, L2ℓh, ..., Lkℓh} be the set of
disjoint paths from an ingress node Nℓ to an egress node Nh.
Every path Liℓh carries segments of independent packets from
an ingress node Nℓ to egress node Nh. Let P ijℓh be the packet
sent from the ingress node Nℓ in path i at time slot j to
the egress node Nh. For simplicity, we describe the proposed
scheme for one particular pair of ingress and egress nodes.
Hence, we use P ij to represent a packet in path i at time slot
j.
Assume there are δ rounds (time slots) in a transmission
session. For the remainder of the paper, rounds and time slots
will be used interchangeably. Packet P ij is indexed as follows:
Packetijℓh(IDNℓ , X
ij, roundj), (1)
where IDNℓ and X ij are the sender ID and transmitted data
from Nℓ in the path Li at time slot j. There are two types of
packets: plain and encoded packets. The plain packet contains
the unencoded data from the ingress to egress nodes as shown
in Equation (1). The encoded packet contains encoded data
from different incoming packets. For example, if there are k
incoming packets to the ingress node Nl, then the encoded
data traversed in the protection path Ljlh to the egress node
Nh is given by
yj =
k∑
i=1,j 6=i
P ijlh , (2)
where the summation denotes the binary addition. The corre-
sponding packet becomes
Packetijℓh(IDNℓ , y
j , roundj). (3)
The following definition describes the working and protec-
tion paths between two network switches as shown in Fig. 1.
Definition 1: The working paths in a network with n con-
nection paths carry un-encoded (plain) traffic under normal
operations. The protection paths provide alternate backup
paths to carry encoded traffic. A protection scheme ensures
that data sent from the sources will reach the receivers in case
of failures in the working paths.
We make the following assumptions about the transmission
of the plain and encoded packets.
i) The TCP protocol will handle the transmission and packet
headers in the edge disjoint paths from the ingress to
egress nodes.
ii) The data from the ingress nodes are sent in rounds and
sessions throughout the edge disjoint paths to the egress
nodes. Each session is quantified by the number of rounds
(time slots) n. Hence, tδj is the transmission time at the
time slot j in session δ.
iii) The attacks and failures on a path Li may be incurred
by a network incident such as an eavesdropper, link
replacement, and overhead. We assume that the receiver
is able to detect a failure, and our protection strategy
described in S-MATE is able to recover it.
iv) We assume that the ingress and egress nodes share a set
of k symmetric keys. Furthermore, the plain and encoded
data are encrypted by using this set of keys. That is
xi = Encyptkeyi(m
i),
where mi is the message encrypted by the keyi. Sharing
symmetric keys between two entities (two core network
nodes) can be achieved by using key establishment pro-
tocols described in [17] and [19].
v) In this network model, we consider only a single link
failure or attack; it is thus sufficient to apply the encoding
and decoding operations over a finite field with two
elements, denoted as F2 = {0, 1}.
The traffic from the ingress node to the egress node in edge
disjoint paths can be exposed to edge failures and network
attacks. Hence, it is desirable to protect and secure this traffic.
We assume that there is a set of k connection paths that need to
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Fig. 2. MATE traffic engineering at the ingress node.
be fully guaranteed and protected against a single edge failure
from ingress to egress nodes. We assume that all connections
have the same bandwidth, and each link (one hop or circuit)
has the same bandwidth as the path.
The benefits of the proposed solutions include the following:
i) network protection is provisioned,
ii) recovery is achieved without retransmitting the lost pack-
ets,
iii) the sender can transmit at a constant high rate,
iv) the lost packets are recovered at the receiver online
without sending an ACK message or notifying the sender
about the failure, and
v) the network traffic is not rerouted or delayed.
III. MATE PROTOCOL
MPLS (Multipath Protocol Label Switching) is an emerging
tool for facilitating network traffic and out-of-band control.
Unlike explicit routing protocols, which allow certain routing
methodology from hop-to-hop in a network with multiple
core devices, MPLS balances network traffic. As shown in
Fig. 2, MATE assumes that several explicit paths between an
ingress node and an egress node in a cloud network have
been established. This is a typical setting which exists in
operational Internet Service Providers (ISP) core networks
(which implement MPLS). The goal of the ingress node is
to distribute traffic across the edge disjoint paths, so that the
loads are balanced. One advantage of this load balancing is to
equalize path delays, and to minimize traffic congestion [9],
[10].
The following are the key features of the MATE algorithm.
1) The traffic is distributed at the granularity of the IP flow
level. This ensures that packets from the same flow follow
the same path, and hence there is no need for packet re-
sequencing at the destination. This is easily and effectively
achieved by using a hashing function on the five tuple IP
address.
2) MATE is a traffic load balancing scheme, which is suitable
for S-MATE, as will be explained later. MATE distributes
traffic among the edge disjoint paths, so as to equalize the
paths delays. This is achieved by using adaptive algorithms
as shown in Fig. 2 and Reference [9]
3) It is shown that the distributed load balancing (for each
ingress, egress pair) is stable and provably convergent.
MATE assumes that several network nodes exist between
ingress nodes as traffic senders and egress nodes as traffic
receivers. Furthermore, the traffic can be adapted by using
switching protocols such as CR-LDP [8] and RSVP-TE [6].
An ingress node is responsible for managing the traffic
in the multiple paths to the egress nodes so that traffic
congestion and overhead are minimized.
As shown in Fig. 2, Label Switch Paths (LSPs) from an
ingress node to an egress node are provisioned before the
actual packet is transmitted. Then, once the transmissions start,
the ingress node will estimate the congestion that might occur
in one or more of the k edge disjoint paths. As stated in
Reference [9], the congestion measure is related to one of the
following factors: delay, loss rate, and bandwidth. In general,
each ingress node in the network will route the incoming
packets into the k disjoint paths. One of these paths will carry
the encoded packets, and all other k− 1 paths will carry plain
packets. Each packet has its own routing number, so that the
egress node will be able to manage the order of the incoming
packet, and thus achieve the decoding operations.
As explained in [9], MATE works in two phases: a mon-
itoring phase and a load balancing phase. These two phases
will monitor the traffic and balance packets among all dis-
joint paths. One beneficial feature of MATE is that its load
balancing algorithms equalize the derivative of delay among
all edge disjoint paths from an ingress node to an egress
node. Furthermore, MATE’s load balancing preserves packet
ordering since load balancing is done at the flow level (which
is identified by a 5-tuple IP address) rather than at the packet
level
We ensure that the proposed protocol in the following
section is suitable for Internet traffic such as voice over
IP (VoIP), multimedia teleconferencing, online gaming, TV
streams. Such traffic is delay-sensitive and intolerant to late
packet arrivals. This approach is different from other tech-
niques for delay-sensitive traffic, including shortest path rout-
ing, or equal load-balancing splitting among multiple paths. As
shown in a Cisco manuscript [1], by 2012 video traffic will
occupy 90% of the total Internet traffic. Hence, techniques
for delay minimization and online protection against failures
are needed. Techniques that depend on shortest paths between
ingress and egress nodes or on retransmitting the lost packets
appear to be impractical for delay sensitive traffics [22].
IV. PROTECTION USING A DEDICATED PATH
In this section, we present a Network Protection Strategy
(NPS) against a single network failure. The single failure could
be one link or one core node (router or switch) in the given
network topology. Let xℓi be the data sent from the source si at
round time ℓ in a session tℓδ. Also, assume yj =
∑k
i=1,i6=j x
ℓ
i .
Put differently,
yℓj = x
ℓ
1 ⊕ x
ℓ
2 ⊕ . . .⊕ x
ℓ
i6=j ⊕ . . .⊕ x
ℓ
k. (4)
The protection scheme runs in sessions as explained below.
Every session has at most one single failure throughout each
round.
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Some network topologies do not allow adding extra paths
between the ingress and egress nodes. In this case, we propose
that one of the available working paths can be used to carry
the encoded data as shown in (5). It shows that there exists
a path Lj that carries the encoded data sent from the source
sj to the receiver rj .
NPS scheme
round time session 1 . . . . . .
1 2 3 . . . . . . n . . . . . .
L1 x
1
1 x
2
1 x
3
1 . . . . . . x
n
1 . . . . . .
L2 x
1
2 x
2
2 x
3
2 . . . . . . x
n
2 . . . . . .
L3 x
1
3 x
2
3 x
3
3 . . . . . . x
n
3 . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . .
Li x
1
i x
2
i . . . x
i−1
i . . . x
n
i . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . .
Lj y
1
j y
2
j y
3
j . . . . . . y
n
j . . . . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . . . . .
Lk x
1
k x
2
k x
3
k . . . . . . x
n
k . . . . . .
(5)
All yℓj’s are defined over F2 as
yℓj =
k∑
i=1,i6=j
xℓi . (6)
Note that the encoded data yℓj is fixed per one session
transmission but it is varied for other sessions. This means
that the path Lj is dedicated to sending all encoded data
y1j , y
2
j , . . . , y
n
j , for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The normalized capacity
of this scheme is still (n− 1)/n.
Lemma 2: The normalized capacity of NPS described
in (5) is given by
C = (k − 1)/(k), (7)
where k is the number of disjoint paths.
Proof: We have n rounds and the total number of trans-
mitted packets in every round is k. Also, in every round there
are (k− 1) un-encoded data x1, x2, . . . xi6=j , . . . , xk and only
one encoded data yj , for all i = 1, . . . , n. Hence, the capacity
cℓ in every round is k− 1. Therefore, the normalized capacity
is given by
C =
∑n
ℓ=1 cℓ
k ∗ n
=
(k − 1) ∗ n
kn
. (8)
The following lemma shows that the network protection
strategy NPS is in fact optimal if we consider the field F2.
In other words, there exist no other strategies that give better
normalized capacity than NPS.
Lemma 3: The network protection shown in (5) against a
single link failure is optimal.
The transmission is done in rounds, and hence linear com-
binations of data have to be from the same round. This can
be achieved by using the round time that is included in each
packet sent by a sender.
rounds from ingress to egress nodes . . .
1 2 3 . . . . . . n . . .
L1lh y
1 P 11 P 12 . . . . . . P 1(n−1) . . .
L2lh P
21 y2 P 22 . . . . . . P 2(n−1) . . .
L3lh P
31 P 32 y3 . . . . . . P 3(n−1) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Ljlh P
j1 P j2 . . . yj . . . P j(n−1) . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lklh P
k1 P k2 . . . . . . P k(k−1) yn . . .
(9)
Encoding Process: There are several scenarios in which the
encoding operations can be achieved. The encoding and decod-
ing operations will depend mainly on the network topology;
how the senders and receivers are distributed in the network.
The encoding operation is done at only one source si (ingress
router). In this case, all other sources must send their data to
si, which will send encoded data over Li. We assume that all
sources share paths with each other.
V. S-MATE
We assume that the network management software at the
router level will compute the available disjoint paths between
ingress and egress routers given the traffic demands, network
flow, and capacity of communication links. In addition, it
determines the network topology, failure locations, and failure
causes. The proposed protocols will minimize congestion in
the network operation in the presence of failures. We can
also use one of the methods proposed in [22] to compute the
available multiple disjoint paths and be aware of the routers’
conditions.
Traffic splitting in MPLS is deployed in today’s routers [18].
This is also done in a flexible way such that packets be-
longing to the same traffic or coming from the same IP
source will travel throughout the same path. Also, the path
failure detection can be done using detection protocol such as
Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) [16]. As explained
in [22], BFD establishes connections between two routers,
ingress and egress nodes, to monitor the traffic paths.
We now propose a scheme for securing MATE, called S-
MATE (Secure Multipath Adaptive Traffic Engineering). The
basic idea of S-MATE can be described by Equation (9). S-
MATE inherits the traffic engineering components described
in the previous section and in References [10] and [9].
Without loss of generality, assume that the network traffic
between a pair of ingress and egress nodes is transmitted
in k edge disjoint paths, each of which carries different
packets. The disjoint paths are already established between the
core nodes using any provisioning mechanism. Our proposed
solution will protect these disjoint paths in case a failure occurs
in one (or more) particular link(s) throughout one (or more)
paths.
The transmission of ingress (source) packets is achieved in
rounds. For simplicity, we assume that the number of edge
disjoint paths and the number of rounds in one transmission
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session are equal. Otherwise, the total number of rounds can
be divided into k separate rounds. There are two types of
packets:
i) Plain Packets: Packets P ij sent without coding, in which
the ingress node does not need to perform any coding
operations. For example, in case of packets sent without
coding, the ingress node Nl sends the following packet
to the egress node Nh:
packetNl→Nh(IDNl , x
ij , tjδ), for i = 1, 2, .., k, i 6= j. (10)
The plain data xij is actually the encryption of the
message mij obtained by using any secure symmetric en-
cryption algorithm [17]. That is, xij = Encyptkeyi(mij),
where keyi is a shared symmetric key between Nl and
Nh.
ii) Encoded Packets: Packets yi sent with encoded data, in
which the ingress node Nl sends other incoming data. In
this case, the ingress node Nl sends the following packet
to egress node Nh:
packetNl→Nh(IDNl ,
j−1∑
i=1
xi j−1 +
k∑
i=j+1
xij , tjδ). (11)
The encoded packet will be used in case any of the
working paths is compromised. The egress node will be
able to detect the compromised data, and can recover it
by using the data sent in the protection path.
Lemma 4: The S-MATE scheme is optimal against a single
link attack.
What we mean by optimal here is that the encoding and
decoding operations are achieved over the binary field with
the least computational overhead. That is, one cannot find a
better scheme than this proposed encoding scheme in terms of
encoding operations. Indeed, one single protection path is used
in case of a single attack path or failure. The transmission is
done in rounds (time slots), and hence linear combinations of
data must be from the same round time. This can be achieved
by using the time slot that is included in each packet sent by
the ingress node.
Lemma 5: The network capacity between the ingress node
and the egress node is given by k−1 in the case of one single
attack path.
A. Encoding Process
There are several scenarios in which the encoding operations
can be achieved. The encoding and decoding operations will
depend mainly on the network topology, i.e., how the senders
and receivers are distributed in the network.
• The encoding operation is done at only one ingress node
Nl. In this case, Nl will prepare and send the encoded
data over Ljlh to the receiver Nh.
• We assume that k packets will be sent in every transmis-
sion session from the ingress node. Also, if the number
of incoming packets is greater than k, then a modulo
function is used to moderate the outgoing traffic in k
different packets. Each packet will be sent in one unique
path.
node node
y1
x21
x31
x41
x51
x11
y2
x32
x42
x52
x12
x22
y3
x43
x53
x13
x23
x33
y4
x54
x14
x24
x34
x44
y5
Fig. 3. Working and protection edge disjoint paths between two core nodes.
The protection path carries encoded packets from all other working paths
between ingress and egress nodes.
• Incoming packets with large sizes will be divided into
small chunks of equal size.
B. Decoding Process
The decoding process is done in a similar way as explained
in the previous work shown in [4] and [3].
We assume that the ingress node Nl assigns the paths
that will carry plain data as shown in Fig. 3. In addition,
Nl will encode the data from all incoming traffic and send
it in one path. This will be used to protect any single
link attacks/failure. The objective is to withhold rerouting
the signals or the transmitted packets due to link attacks.
However, we provide strategies that utilize network coding
and reduced capacity at the ingress nodes. We assume that
the source nodes (ingress) are able to perform encoding
operations and the receiver nodes (ogress) are able to perform
decoding operations.
One of S-MATE’s objectives is to minimize the delay of
the transmitted packets. So, the packets from one IP address
will be received in order in one path. The following are the
key features of S-MATE.
• The traffic from the ingress node to the egress node is
secured against eavesdropper and intruders.
• No extra paths in addition to the existing network edge
disjoint paths are needed to secure the network traffic.
• It can be implemented without adding new hardware or
network components.
The following example illustrates the plain and encoded data
transmitted from five senders to five receivers.
Example 1: Let Nl and Nh be two core network nodes (a
sender and receiver) in a cloud network. Equation (12) explains
the plain and encoded data sent in five consecutive time slots
from the sender to the receiver. In the first time slot, the first
connection carries encoded data, and all other connections
carry plain data. Furthermore, the encoded data is distributed
SUBMITTED, DECEMBER 2010 6
among all connections in the time slots 2, 3, 4 and 5.
cycle 1 2 3
rounds 1 2 3 4 5 . . . . . .
L1lh y
1 x11 x12 x13 x14 . . . . . .
L2lh x
21 y2 x22 x23 x24 . . . . . .
L3lh x
31 x32 y3 x33 x34 . . . . . .
L4lh x
41 x42 x43 y4 x44 . . . . . .
L5lh x
51 x52 x53 x54 y5 . . . . . .
(12)
The encoded data yj , for 1 ≤ j ≤ 5, is sent as
yj =
j−1∑
i=1
xi j−1 +
5∑
i=j+1
xij . (13)
We notice that every message has its own time slot. Hence,
the protection data is distributed among all paths for fairness.
VI. A STRATEGY AGAINST TWO ATTACKED PATHS
In this section, we propose a strategy against two attacked
paths (links), i.e., securing MATE against two-path attacks.
The strategy is achieved by using network coding and dedi-
cated paths. Assume we have n connections carrying data from
an ingress node to an egress node. All connections represent
disjoint paths.
We will provide two backup paths to secure against any
two disjoint paths, which might experience any sort of attacks.
These two protection paths can be chosen by using network
provisioning. The protection paths are fixed for all rounds per
session from the ingress node to the egress node, but they
may vary among sessions. For example, the ingress node Nl
transmits a message xiℓ to the egress node Nh through path
Liℓh at time tℓδ in round time ℓ in session δ. This process is
explained in Equation (14) as follows:
cycle 1 . . .
1 2 3 . . . n . . .
L1lh x
11 x12 x13 . . . x1n . . .
L2lh x
21 x22 x23 . . . x2n . . .
L3lh x
31 x32 x33 . . . x3n . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lilh x
i1 xi2 xi3 . . . xin . . .
Ljlh y
j1 yj2 yj3 . . . yjn . . .
Lklh y
k1 yk2 yk3 . . . ykn . . .
Li+1lh x
(i+1)1 x(i+1)2 x(i+1)3 . . . x(i+1)n . . .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. . . .
Lnlh x
n1 xn2 xn3 . . . xnn . . .
(14)
All yℓj’s are defined as
yjℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=j 6=k
aℓix
iℓ and ykℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=k 6=j
bℓix
iℓ. (15)
The coefficients aℓi and bℓi are chosen over a finite field Fq
with q > n−2; see [4], [5] for more details. One way to choose
these coefficients is by using the following two vectors:[
1 1 1 . . . 1
1 α α2 . . . αn−3
]
. (16)
Therefore, the coded data is
yjℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=j 6=k
xiℓ and ykℓ =
n∑
i=1,i6=k 6=j
αi mod n−2xiℓ. (17)
In the case of two failures, the receivers will be able to
solve two linearly independent equations with two unknown
variables. For instance, assume the two failures occur in paths
number two and four. Then, the receivers will be able to
construct two equations with coefficients[
1 1
α α3
]
.
Therefore, we have
x2ℓ + x4ℓ (18)
αx2ℓ + α3x4ℓ. (19)
One can multiply the first equation by α and subtract the two
equations to obtain the value of x4ℓ.
Note that the encoded data symbols yjℓ and ykℓ are fixed
for one session, but they are varied for other sessions. This
means that the path Ljlh is dedicated to send all encoded data
yj1, yj2, . . . , yjn.
Lemma 6: The network capacity of the protection strategy
against two-path attacks is given by n− 2.
There are three different scenarios for two-path attacks,
which can be described as follows:
i) If the two-path attacks occur in the backup protection
paths Ljlh and Lklh, then no recovery operations are
required at the egress node.
ii) If the two-path attacks occur in one backup protection
path, say Ljlh, and one working path Lilh, then recovery
operations are required.
iii) If the two-path attacks occur in two working paths, then
in this case the two protection paths are used to recover
the lost data. The idea of recovery in this case is to build
a system of two linearly independent equations with two
unknown variables.
VII. MULTIPLE PROTECTION PATHS USING S-MATE
In this section, we present S-MATE against t attacked paths.
We adopt the same notations as in the previous sections.
Assume also that the total number of attacks is t, and they
happen on arbitrary t paths from the ingress node to the egress
node.
Let m = ⌈n/t⌉, and hence we have m rounds per cycle.
The encoding operations of NPS-T against t attacks/failures
are described by (20). We can see that yℓ in general is given
by
yℓ =
(j−1)t∑
i=1
aℓix
j−1
i +
n∑
i=jt+1
aℓix
j
i
for (j − 1)t+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ jt, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (21)
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NPS-T Scheme
1 2 . . . j . . . m = ⌈n/t⌉
s1 → r1 y1 x
1
1 . . . x
j−1
1 . . . x
m−1
1
s2 → r2 y2 x
1
2 . . . x
j−1
2 . . . x
m−1
2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
st → rt yt x
1
t . . . x
j−1
t . . . x
m−1
t
st+1→rt+1 x
1
t+1 yt+1 . . . x
3
2t+1 . . . x
m−1
2t+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
s2t → r2t x
1
2t y2t . . . x
3
2t . . . x
m−1
2t
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sjt+ℓ→rjt+ℓ x
1
jt+ℓ x
2
jt+ℓ . . . y
3
jt+ℓ . . . x
m−1
jt+ℓ
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
st(m−1)+1 → rt(m−1)+1 x
1
t(m−1)+1 x
2
t(m−1)+1 . . . x
j
t(m−1)+1 . . . yt(m−1)+1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
smt → rmt x
1
mt x
2
mt . . . x
j
mt . . . ymt
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
(20)
Fig. 4. The encoding scheme of t link failures. m = ⌈n/t⌉, 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ t. t out of the n connections carry encoded data. The coefficients
are chosen over Fq , for q ≥ n− t+ 1.
A. Encoding Operations
Assume that each connection path Li has a unit capacity
from an ingress source si to an egress receiver ri. The data
sent from the source si to the receiver ri is transmitted in
rounds. Under NPS-T, in every round n− t paths are used to
carry new data (xji ), and t paths are used to carry protected
data units. There are t protection paths. Therefore, to treat all
connections fairly, there will be n/t rounds in a cycle, and in
each round the capacity is given by n − t from the ingress
node to the egress node.
We consider the case in which all symbols xji belong to
the same round. The first t sources transmit the first encoded
data units y1, y2, . . . , yt, and in the second round, the next t
sources transmit yt+1, yt+2, . . . , y2t, and so on. The ingress
and egress nodes must keep track of the round numbers. Let
IDsi and xsi be the ID and data initiated by the source si.
Assume the round time j in cycle δ is given by tjδ. Then,
the source si will send packetsi on the working path which
includes
Packetsi = (IDsi , x
ℓ
i , t
ℓ
δ). (22)
Also, the source sj , which transmits on a protection path, will
send a packet packetsj :
Packetsj = (IDsj , yj, t
ℓ
δ), (23)
where yk is defined as
yℓ =
(j−1)t∑
i=1
aℓix
j−1
i +
n∑
i=jt+1
aℓix
j
i
for (j − 1)t+ 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ jt, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. (24)
Hence, the protection paths are used to protect the data
transmitted in round ℓ, which are included in the xli data units.
So, we have a system of t independent equations at each round
time that will be used to recover at most t unknown variables.
The strategy NPS-T is a generalization of protecting against
a single path failure shown in the previous section in which
t protection paths are used instead of one protection path in
case of one failure.
Theorem 7: Let n be the total number of connections from
the ingress node to the egress node. The capacity of NPC
defined over Fq against t path attacks is given by
CN = (n− t)/(n) (25)
B. Proper Coefficients Selection
One way to select the coefficients aℓj in each round such
that we have a system of t linearly independent equations is
by using the matrix H shown in Eq. (26). Let q be the order
of a finite field, and α be the qth root of unity. Then, we can
use this matrix to define the coefficients of the senders as:
H =


1 1 1 . . . 1
1 α α2 · · · αn−1
1 α2 α4 · · · α2(n−1)
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αt−1 α2(t−1) · · · α(t−1)(n−1)


. (26)
We make the following assumptions about the encoding oper-
ations.
1) Clearly, if we have one failure t = 1, then all coefficients
will be one. The first sender will always choose the unit
value.
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2) If we assume t failures, then y1, y2, . . . , yt are written as:
y1 =
n∑
i=t+1
x1i , y2 =
n∑
i=t+1
α(i−1)x2i , (27)
yj =
n∑
i=t+1
αi(j−1) mod (q−1)xℓi . (28)
The previous equation gives the general theme to choose
the coefficients at any particular round in any cycle. However,
the encoded data yi’s are defined as shown in (28). In other
words, for the first round in cycle one, the coefficients of the
plain data x1, x2, . . . , xt are set to zero.
VIII. NETWORK PROTECTION USING DISTRIBUTED
CAPACITIES AND QOS
In this section, we develop a network protection strategy
in which some connection paths (network traffic) have high
priorities (less bandwidth and high demand). Let k be the
set of available connections (disjoint paths from ingress to
egress nodes carrying network traffic). Let m be the set
of rounds in every cycle. We assume that all connection
paths might not have the same priority demand and working
capacities. The assigned priority itself can be done by using
management software. This can also be achieved by looking
at the packet headers and checking what kind of traffic they
carry. Also, the priority can depend on the source IP address.
Connections that carry applications with multimedia traffic
have higher priorities than those of applications carrying data
traffic. Therefore, it is required to design network protection
strategies based on the traffic and sender priorities.
Consider that available working connections k may use their
bandwidth assignments in asymmetric ways. Some connec-
tions are less demanding in terms of bandwidth requirements
than other connections that require full capacity frequently.
Therefore, connections with less demand can transmit more
protection packets, while other connections demand more
bandwidth, and can therefore transmit fewer protection packets
throughout transmission rounds. Let m be the number of
rounds and tδi be the time of transmission in a cycle δ at round
i. For a particular cycle i, let t be the number of protection
paths against t link failures or attacks that might affect the
working paths. We will design a network protection strategy
against t arbitrary link failures as follows. Let the source
sj send di data packets and pi protection packets such that
dj + pj = m. That is,
k∑
i=1
(di + pi) = km. (29)
In general, we do not assume that di = dj and pi = pj .
The encoded data yiℓ is given by
yiℓ =
∑
k=1,ykℓ 6=ykℓ
xkℓ. (31)
We assume that the maximum number of attacks/failures
that might occur in a particular cycle is t. Hence, the number
of protection paths (paths that carry encoded data) is t. The
QoS S-MATE Scheme
round time cycle 1
1 2 3 4 . . . m− 1 m
L1ℓh y
11 x11 x12 y12 . . . y1p1 x1d1
L2ℓh x
21 y21 x22 x23 . . . x2d2 y2p2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Liℓh y
i1 xi1 xi2 yi2 . . . yipi xidi
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Ljℓh x
j1 xj2 yj1 xj3 . . . xjdj yjpj
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Lkℓh x
k1 yk1 xk2 xk4 . . . ykpk xkdk
(30)
selection of the working and protection paths in every round
is done by using a demand-based priority function at the
senders’s side. It will also depend on the traffic type and
service provided on these protection and working connections.
See Fig. 5 for ingress and egress nodes with five disjoint
connections.
In Eq. (30), every connection i is used to carry di unencoded
data xi1, xi2, . . . , xidi (working paths) and pi encoded data
yi1, yi2, . . . , yipi (protection paths) such that di + pi = m.
Lemma 8: Let t be the number of connection paths carry-
ing encoded data in every round. The network capacity CN is
then given by
CN = k − t. (32)
Proof: The proof is forward straight from the fact that t
protection paths exist in every round among the k available
disjoint paths, and hence k − t working paths are available
throughout all m rounds.
IX. PRACTICAL ASPECTS
The network protection strategy against a link failure is
deployed in two processes: encoding and decoding operations.
The encoding operations are performed at the ingress router,
which will send the encoded data depending on the adapted
strategy throughout the available multipaths. The packets are
sent in rounds. Each packet is marked by using the current
round time and the path number. This is achieved till all
packets are sent throughout all paths.
The decoding operations are performed at the receiver
side (egress router), which will apply XOR operations to all
incoming traffic to recover the lost packets in case of a single
link failure. If the receivers can tolerate a large amount of
delay as in the case of storage files, then, the S-MATE strategy
can be used. For applications that cannot tolerate packet delays
(delay sensitive traffic) such as multimedia or TV streams, the
S-MATE strategy can be used. We also note that the delay
will occur only when a failure occurs in the protection paths.
The transmission is done in rounds, and hence linear com-
binations of data have to be from the same round. This can
be achieved by using the round time that is included in each
packet sent by a sender.
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Fig. 5. Working and protection edge disjoint paths between two core nodes
(ingress and egress nodes). Every path Li carries encoded and plain packets
depending on the traffic priority pi.
The core routers will manage the available multipaths by
using network management software. In this case, the number
of link disjoint paths are known and provisioned in advance.
Furthermore, the routers will decide which protection strate-
gies will be used depending on the network conditions and
number of failures.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed the S-MATE scheme (secure
multipath adaptive traffic engineering) for operational net-
works. We have utilized network coding of transmitted packets
to protect the traffic between two network core nodes (routers,
switches, etc.) that could exist in a cloud network. Our assump-
tion is based on the fact that core network nodes share multiple
edge disjoint paths. S-MATE can secure network traffic against
single link attacks/failures by adding redundancy in one of the
operational paths between the sender and receiver. It can also
be used to secure network traffic against two and multiple
attacks/failures. The proposed scheme can be built to secure
operational networks including optical and multipath adaptive
networks. In particular, it can provide security services at the
IP and data link layers.
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